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TARIFFS AED TH3 EXPORT OF-HOME GOODS THROUGH TOURISM 
Jamos Rakowski 
. From a selfish point of view, a tariff up to a ccrtain level may make 
sense, at least in a world lacking the institutions to carry out the inter-
national transfers required "by the compensation principle. It is well-known 
from traditional theory 1 that a country can use its monopoly power to ex-
ploit a passive trading partner at the expense of world efficiency,, This paper 
examines the question of whether a country which earns its foreign exchange 
2 
from the"export" of home goods through tourism might not gain more by a tar-
iff than one would expect from a casual application of the traditional trade 
model to such a country. For in such a case the traditional model must be 
modified' somewhat to account for the fact that the home country can affect ; 
directly not only the prices at which its citizens trade, but also the prices 
at which the tourists (who comprise its trading partner) trad.. since the 
tourists must trade at home' country prices. Properly conceived, a country in 
such a situation has an additional degree of monopoly power, and one might 
sensibly expect that an analysis of a model which captures this extra element 
of monopoly power would reveal a greater potential for gain than would an 
application' of the traditional model. As far as I know, no one has commented 
in the literature on the need to modify the traditional'model for such cases, 
and thus the gains from a tariff to a country.which caters to tourists are 
perhaps being underestimated. To say this is, of course, not to advocate- a 
tariff for such a country; for even if one is to argue against a tariff, one 
must know if• he is opposed to it because it is selfish or because it is stupid. 
This paper suggests that a tariff levied by a country x-ihich exports tourism 
is somewhat more: likely to be selfish and somewhat less likely to be stupid 
than previously believed. 
Let us. define a tourist as a visitor whose presence.in the.home country 
has no effects on the home country^ production possibilities curve, -whose 
entire income is earned outside of the home country, and whose welfare does 
not enter into the appraisal of home—country welfare. It is important to rea-
lize that a tourist trades with the home country only insofar as he buys goods 
"'"See any international trade textbook, for example, Kindloberger (2), 
pp. 117-122. 
2 -I know of no country which earns all its foreign exchange from tourism. 
It appears, however, that tourism accounts for about 10$ of Kenyans foreign 
exchange earnings on current account« 
2 -
and services produced by the home country. Insofar as the tourist comes to 
the home country -with his income and spends it there on imported goods, the 
flaw of goods must be interpreted not as intcrnationa1 trade, but G.S 3, gCO— 
graphical extension of the domestic trade of the,foreign country. The econorry 
of the home country is left untouched.^ However,,the domestic trade of the 
foreign country, geographically -extended as it is, is now peculiarly vulnerable 
to the policies of the home country; and insofar as a tariff induces tourists 
to buy goods and services of the home country instead of foreign goods subject 
to the tariff-., the tariff acts not as an impediment to international trade, 
A 
but rather as a stimulant to international trade,' and indeed' as an impedi-
ment to the domestic trade of the foreign.country. 
Before setting up a rigorous .model, it is well to reflect upon what 
might be expected from a model depicting such a situation,. General inter-
national equilibrium in the absence of tariffs is depicted in Figure 1 as 
the intorse-ction of the offer curve of the home country (OH) and the offer 
curve of the foreign country (OF), with the ray from the origin to the point 
of intersection (OP) indicating the equilibrium- terms of trade. How a tariff 5 
as traditionally conceived shifts the home offer curve from OH to OH' but 
leaves the foreign offer curve unchanged. In the now, tariff-ridden 
equilibrium the terms of trade have improved from OP to OP1 — a "good" factor 
for the home country — but the volume of trade has contracted,from OX and 
OM to OX1 and OM® — a "bad" factor for the home country. The home country 
might wish to exploit the good factor just up to the point where it is marginally 
counterbalanced by "the bad factor, and it could do so by levying the well—known 
"optimal" tariff., which can be protrayed in Figure 1 with the help of community 
indifference curves ^ (here transformed into trade indifference curves) as that 
tariff which induces.an equilibrium on the highest possible indifference curve, 
I . o 
3 This is true if we ignore, as is usual in simple trade models, the 
contribution of the home country to transport and merchandising. 
4 Actually, it is only the substitution effect of the tariff which,stimulates 
international trade. The tariffs which the tourist pays on foreign goods 
which he is loathe to give up impoverish him so that he can afford fewer : 
home goods (an income effect). 
5 We will be assuming throughout that tariff revenues are handed back to home 
consumers, to be spent according to their preferences. For a discussion of 
what difference it makes, see Metzlor ( 4 ) ° 
6 The assumption of community indifference curves rules out certain problems 
of distribution which might in some cases provide an additional rationale 
for tariffs. 
Now what our previous considerations have led us to suspect"is that 
a country which exports tourism can "by a tariff shift; not only the home 
offer curve, hut also the foreign offer curve, perhaps as indicated in 
Figure 2. Clearly this opens the possibility of larger gains for the home 
country, Note that as drawn Figure 2 dees not" indicate an unambiguous con-
traction in trade, but rather an expansion of home country imports. In the 
following analysis of a more rigorous model we wish to. determine just how 
the foreign offer curve is likely to shift and to ascertain whether the gain 
to the home country from any given tariff is likely to be greater than indi— 
7 cated by the traditional model. 
I The Model • " r ' .." 
A. equilibrium with no tariffs : 
The home country with its given factor endowments can produce two com-
modities, in quantities X^ and X^jaccording to a production possibilities 
curve 
i ) x 2 = f ( x 1 ) . v ! 
We shall subsequently interpret good 1 as a manufactured good, the.natural 
import of the home country., and. good 2 as .local goods, and. services, a home good 
which is exported only to tourists. Home' demand for the first commodity 
depends upon the prices of the two commodities and income (assuming, as does, 
7 We may, of course,: be speaking of negative gains. That is, we may be asking 
whether the loss is less than indicated by the traditional model. 
for example, Kemp (l, p.22), that the home community behaves like a single, 
8 
utility maximizing individual); . - . • • ' . 
2) = D 1 (P1, P2,..P1J-1 + P2X2). 
We need now only add a budget constraint (which makes unnecessary the speci-
fication of a demand function for the second good) 
3)~ (X1 - D 1) ?1 + (X2 - D2)P2 = 0 
and an equilibrium condition under the assumption of perfect competition 
4 ) d X 2 M l ' along f = V P 2 , ' . . . . . 
These four equations, involving the six unknowns i) , D2, 
are sufficient, given one absolute price, to determine the.traditional offer 
curve for the home country, which is indicated in Figure 3, where for convenience 
we define E, = IL — Xn , E_ = D 0 - X.. I l l and 2 2 2 
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The offer curvc we have thus constructed is formally identical to 
the traditional offer curve, and it is only our peculiar interpretation of 
good 2 as a home good which can "be exported only to tourists which sets our 
model apart. It is in the following construction of the foreign offer curve 
that our model diverges significantly from the traditional. 
Foreign tourists arrive in the home country with a given amount of 
money income M*. Since it is sometimes simpler to think in terms of a barter 
economy, we make the artificial (hut not restrictive) assumption that upon 
arrival they exchange their money for an amount of good 1 which is available 
to them at a constant price P^ (since they are not enough of a market force 
to perceptibly influence the world price). They then stand ready to barter 
with the home country so as to obtain the utility maximizing bundle of goods, 
Uote that the good 1 held by the tourists is the only good 1 potentially 
available to the home country from abroad because in this barter model the 
home country has nothing to exchange with the rest of the world, since its 
only export is a home good.9 
The foreign demand for good 1 is 
(5) - D ^ = 3-j* (F 1 ? P 2 ? M* ) . 
Foreign supply of*each good is 
(6) X * = M*/P1 
(7) x2* = 0 
Foreigners are subject to a budget constraint 
(8) D1*P1 +D 2*P 2 = S**. 
And we assume that 
(9) P 1 = P r 
How these five equations are equivalent to an offer curvc is illustrated 
graphically in Figure 4« Starting from an endowment point at M*/P on the 
good 1 axis (as stipulated by equations 6)-and 7) )y the utility-maximizing 
foreigners trade along a budget constraint (equation 8) ) until they reach an 
optimal amount of good 
1 (the amount indicated by equation 5).)« The distance 
D^* — X^* IS E^* (here negative) is' excess demand for good 1, and the 
distance D^* — 0 = Eg* is excess demand for good 2. Changing the axes we 
have an offer curve as in Figure 5« 
9 Of course, in the'real world the home country can exchange its currency 
for foreign goods, but it can do so only insofar as its Currency is of use 
to someone for the purohase of goods. 

10 Applying the principle of Marshall (3) that the elasticity of demand for a 
good is likely to be smaller, the smaller'the proportion of total expenditures 
accounted for by expenditure on that good, this first interpretation may be 
approximately true for East Africa, where the primary expense for most 
tourists is the air fare. 
11 Wc can be sure that the domestic mone^ price of good 1 is always p^(l+t) = 
P.(1+t) because as long as some good 1 comes'from abroad the domestic price 
must equal the foreign price plus the tariff, any difference having been 
arbitraged away. And we know that some good 1 comes from abroad since the 
tourists in effect bring it with thern^ and the relative price adjusts so that 
sonc of it is taken off their hands. 

- 9 
The equations in Model B which determine the home country offer 
ourve, IB) - 4B)s differ from the corresponding equations in Model A in 
that they include additional tariff revenues. In Model B , home country 
tariff revenues are hound.to be M*t , since the foreigners' money income 
" 1+t 
is all spent on imported good 1 (some of which is later traded off to the 
home country); and thus tariff revenues in Model B exceed those in Model 
A by M*t - E-.P t. 
1+t 1 1 
. Equations $) - 9)? ;which deterimine the foreign country offer 
curve, are modified to indicate that foreign tourists now trade at tariff-
distorted prices and that some of "the tourists* potential supply of good 1 
is in effect "confiscated" at customs. 
Although one might take total derivatives of the equations of both 
models with respect to t and compare the response to a change in t of 
the various variables in Model A with the response of the same variables) 
in Model B, I propose to proceed by: analyzing graphically the indicated 
shifts in each of the offer curves as one moves from Model A to Model B.' 
Implicit in such a procedure is the assumption that our equations are suich 
as to give us "normal-looking" offer curves, as drawn above. 
First for the home-country offer curve: The home country in effect 
collects an additional (H* — E^ )•• t of good 1, which is net obtained from 
P1 1+t 
international trade but is expropriated from foreigners who are merely 
trying to pursue domestic trade. Since in the construction of the home 
country offer curve M*, P^, and t are parameters, the additional tariff 
revenues depend (inversely) on the single variable E . Thus, in terms 
1 1 of Figure 7i when the home country exchanges OE^ of good 2 for OE^ of 
good 1 in trade along the offer curve of Model A, it acquires (M^ ; -E ) t 
P1 1+t 
of good 1 as an added boon. In general, however, the home country does 
not wish to take its increased income all in the form of good 1, but 
(assuming that good 2 is not inferior) desires to consume more of good 2 
also. Therefore at the indicated prices it is no longer content to trade 
away OE^ of good 2 for of good l, but wishes to keep somewhat more 
of good 2 for its own consumption and take in somewhat less of good 1 in 
exohange. This is equivalent to saying that the offer curveoH^ lies above 12 OH., as indicated in Figure 7* 
• . - x'inding. 
12 I have not succeeded in / a graphical demonstration of exactly', 
how the new offer curve is derived from the old. 
1 1 -
And now we consider "the foreign offer curve,, Consider the again the 
graphical technique of Figure 4, reproduced in Figure 8. The foreign supply 
of good 1 available for exchange, X *, is reduced from P to P _ . 
- ' • P 1 P1(l+t) 
Our problem is to find the new offer curve emanating from point M* 
remembering that the relevant price rays must now be designated P^(l+t) 
The question we are asking is nothing other than x^ ihat happens to 
E * = D^* - X^* when X.^ * (and thus real income) is reduced by an amount 
Zi X-j*o The answer, of course, is that E^*.is reduced as long as good 1 is 
not inferior in foreigners' tastes, but that it is reduced.by less than 
A X * , as long as good 2 is not inferior in foreigners' tastes-
For Model F»e "therefore have a .-foreign offer"curve as indicated by; 
OF-r, in Figure 9« ' The"foreign country automatically surrenders M* t „ , 
B . FT l+t ° g0°d 
1 2 1 and with its smaller supply is willing to trade away E^ of good 1 jfor Eg 
of good' 2, regarding the ray Oq = Pg as the relevant price ratio. In sum 
p J T i ^ O 
the foreign tourists give up an amount of good 1 indicated hy the curve OF.g 
(and it is this curve which we will subsequently compare with the foreign 
offer curve of Model A). 
Of the tariff revenues, S^^t^' are in effect being paid by the-home 
1+t 
country consumers of good 1 when'they decide to purchase the imported good 
from the foreign tourists at the tariff-distorted price; and thus tbe price • 
ratio at which the home country as a whole obtains imports is Pg , represented 
FT" 
by the ray O P . It is the point P through which in equilibrium 
the home country offer curve must pass. 
Such an equilibrium is shown in Figure 10. The equilibrium terms of 
trade are 0PB and the home' country obtains from abroad E-^of good 1 in | 
exchange for Eg1 ,of good 2 and E_ - E 1 1 =_M* - S _t_ of good 1 in tariff 
P 1 1+t 
collections from foreigners. Thus point C is the final home country 
consumption point. '.,.." j 
II The Gains from a Tariff Under Alternative Models 
Is the gain to the tariff-levying country greater in Model B than in 
Model A? If good.2 is not inferior in the tastes of either the home country 
or the foreigners, under our assumptions the answer is bound to be "yes". 
For then we know that the offer curves lie as indicated -in Figure 11. OHg 
' aX <?-< CjWtO fJHt« 
lies above and 0F^ must lie above 0F^ because.vthe foreigners' offerings 
of good 1 will contract by less than the reduction in market supply, all of 
which reduction is turned over to the home country. 
If.good 2 is inferior in the tastes of either the foreign or home 
consumers, the answer may but need not be "no". Even if good 2 is inferior 
in the tastes of both groups of consumers, it is not evident that the answer 
must be "no", as Figure 12 illustrates. 
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And, indeed, for a high enough tariff one must relax our assumption that 
that M* is constant if he to avoid the absurdity of saying that tourists keep 
coming to the home country undeterred by the fact that they must effectively 
surrender all their income. If one did not relax our assumption,the optimal 
tariff for the home country would be infinite; for by such a tariff the home 
country could confiscate all the good 1 which the tourists in effect bring 
with them. But if one cannot justify holding M* constant for a high tariff, 
one might nevertheless justify holding M* constant for a moderate tariff,! Thus 
M» might depend upon t as indicated in Figure 13. In the absence of empirical 
data, the best assumption about M* for moderate values of t might be that; it • 
is constant at 
13 One might introduce an elasticity of M* with respect to tj but giving 
something unknown a sophisticated name does not extend knowledge. On 
the other hand the elasticity of M* with regard to P, the home country's 
price level, might be estimated empirically. But how P reacts to t is 
determined only in general equilibrium, and the problem becomes 
mathematically too complex for me. 
16 -
III Conclusion 
If one were to ask policy makers in certain countries which cater 
to tourists why certain items are subject to high tariffs, I would expects 
them to express sentiments something like the following; "These items are 
purchased mostly hy foreigners and we wish to collcct tariff revenues from 
these foreigners and to encourage them to purchase domestically produced 
goods and services instead". This paper is meant to suggest that such 
sentiments are more sensible than has been recognized by international 
trade theorists. • :. 
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